

SUBJECT: Information Policy Guidance on Cuba

It is imperative that we obtain maximum public support abroad for our policies and actions with respect to Guba. This information policy instruction is binding on all elements of the U. S. Information Agency, and all other media and information outlets controlled by the U. S. Government. A separate instruction covers output directed to Guba.

OBJECTIVES

- 1. Obtain worldwide understanding and support for the quarantine and any other U. S. actions which may be required.
- 2. Convince world opinion that the USSR and the Castro regime bear the entire responsibility for the crisis growing out of the secret Soviet military build-up in Cuba.
- 3. Make clear to the world that the U. S. wants peace not war, but that we will do whatever is necessary to protect the freedom and security of the U. S., the western hemisphere and the Free World generally.
- 4. Make clear to the world that we wish to restore to the Cuban people "the dream of their own revolution--the dream which Fidel Castro repudiated," and that we have no desire to see the status quo ante restored.


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
6. Encourage public expressions and manifestations of support for the U. S. position and opposition to the Soviets.

THEMES

Pending further developments, the President's speech provides us with our main guidelines. Output should emphasize:


- I. The complete justification of U. S. actions, based on the "unmistakable evidence" of secret Soviet-built offensive nuclear missile bases in Cuba and the grave threat of these bases to the security of this hemisphere and the peace of the entire world.
- 2. By secretly building offensive nuclear missile bases in Cuba, the Soviet Union has greatly increased the threat of war--thus exposing not only the people of the USSR, Eastern Europe and Cuba to nuclear destruction, but people everywhere.
- 3. The U.S. wants to settle this problem peacefully, as evidenced by President Kennedy's message to Khrushchev, his announced willingness to negotiate in any forum, and our taking the issue to the United Nations.





- 4. There are only two reasons for the secret Soviet arms build-up in Cuba--and both serve only the interests of the Soviet Union, not Cuba or any other nation: (a) aggression and subversion throughout the western hemisphere, and (b) subjugation of the Cuban people.
- 5. The deceit practiced by the Soviet and Castro Governments is the first of the secret military build-up in Cuba was "defensive" form in nature; therefore the untrustworthiness of the USSR. Recall the Soviet Union's long history of lies, broken promises, deceptions and aggressions, and Castro's hiding of the Communist character of his movement until well after he was in power.
 - 6. The difference between U. S. missile bases in Turkey and elsewhere, and the Soviet bases in Cuba. Our bases have not been kept secret and are strictly for defensive purposes, similar to the Soviet bases in the Warsaw Pact nations. The secretly-built Soviet bases in Cuba, however, are clearly for offensive purposes and not to defend the USSR which has sufficient strength to protect itself--as Khrushchev has so often noted--without Cuban bases. (Use this only if hostile comment compares Cuban bases to U. S. bases in other countries.)
 - 7. The <u>limited</u> nature of the U. S. quarantine. It will keep offensive arms from Cuba, but not food or medicine. No shots need be fired, no blood need be shed. The U. S. wants peace, not war.





- 8. The U.S. is acting to protect the western hemisphere (including the people of Cuba) from the threat of aggression, and the world from the threat of war.
- 9. The U.S. is acting to give back to the Cuban people the dream of their own revolution which Castro sold out to the Communists. The Cuban people deserve that same right of self-determination and free choice given the people of other nations.
- 10. People throughout the world support these U. S. actions in defense of peace and freedom. (Make full use of responsible opinion, foreign and domestic, in support of our position. Emphasize favorable reaction from Latin America and the "nonaligned" countries. In cross-reporting reaction to individual countries and areas, emphasize comments from personalities and nations which have a high credibility in those countries and areas.)
- 11. Cuban developments do not change the Berlin situation. The people of West Berlin, like the people of Cuba, have every right to freedom and self-determination. Therefore the U.S. has not and will not alter its determination to maintain its presence in West Berlin to protect that city's freedom and accessibility.
- 12. Similarly, U. S. commitments to its Allies around the world remain unchanged. It would be a grave mistake for Communist aggressors



to attempt adventures elsewhere in the hope that the U. S. would be too preoccupied with Cuba to react rapidly and effectively.

Following expected Organization of American States (OAS) endorsement of the U.S. quarantine and related actions, we should also emphasize:

- 1. The solidarity of the peoples and governments of the Americas in support of our actions, and in opposition to Castro Commur sm in general and the secret Soviet arms build-up in particular.
- 2. The legal basis for U. S. actions, deriving from the OAS vote which in turn rests on the 1947 Treaty of Rio de Janeiro.

SPECIAL GUIDANCE

- 1. We should avoid inflammatory comment and overly emotional presentation. We do not want premature (i.e., unsuccessful) uprisings in Cuba, nor do we wish to make it unnecessarily difficult for the Soviet Union to retreat from its stand on Cuba.
- 2. We do, however, wish to encourage widespread public criticism of the Soviet Union and the Castro regime, including such manifestations and demonstrations as may be feasible and prudent.
- 3. We should <u>not</u> use any comment, regardless of source, which is not wholly consistent with the lines set forth in the President's speech and this instruction.

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